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Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Heiko Giebler and Bernhard Weßels
WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany
Abstract
European democracies have experienced drastic changes in electoral competition. Voter support for insider parties that
have traditionally governed has declined while support for radical and populist parties has increased. Simultaneously,
citizens’ declining political trust has become a concern, as confidence in political institutions and actors is low across
numerous countries. Interestingly, the linkage between political trust and support for insider parties has not been
empirically established but deduced from the fact that outsider parties are often supported by dissatisfied citizens. We
address this gap adopting both an institutional- and an actor-centered approach by investigating whether trust in
parliaments and in parties is associated with the electoral performance of insider parties on the aggregate level.
Combining different data sources in a novel way, we apply time-series cross-section models to a dataset containing
30 countries and 137 elections from 1998 to 2018. Our results show that when political trust is low, particularly
institutional trust, insider parties receive less electoral support. Hence, we provide empirical evidence that decreasing
levels of political trust are the downfall of insider parties, thereby opening a window of opportunity for challenging
outsider parties.
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Introduction
The third wave of democratization represented a global
trend in which over 60 countries transitioned to democracy
(Huntington, 1991). Particularly, the end of the Cold War
marked the triumph of democracy over autocratic rule,
raising democratic hopes. Yet, as democracies celebrated,
signs of citizens’ distrust in the democratic process
emerged (Dalton, 1999: 57). Very soon, declaring “the end
of history” as well as the victory of liberal democracy
(Fukuyama, 1992) seemed rather premature. The crisis of
democracy has become a recurring topic in media and
scholarly work alike, as democracy is currently under
severe pressure in many countries around the world. This
pressure comes mainly from within. On the one hand, the
current democratic decline is characterized by the use of
legal and gradual strategies to undermine democracy,
including government manipulation of the media, civil
society, rule of law and elections (Lührmann and Lindberg,
2019; Lührmann et al., 2019). On the other hand, there is a
certain mismatch between citizens’ preferences and
institutional arrangements and the deterioration of citizens’
belief in “real-world” democracy. Interestingly, support for
democracy as an ideal or the most preferred political
regime has remained rather stable and high since the
1990s (Dalton, 1999; Norris, 2011) while a decline of trust
in and satisfaction with political institutions and demo-
cratic processes was observed across several European
democracies (Kaase, 1999).
Dissatisfaction and lack of trust in the democratic pro-
cess have been linked to different factors. Almond and
Verba (1963: 31) contended that in a civic culture, citizens
are allegiant: They respect the law and the legitimate polit-
ical authority and are oriented positively toward the
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democratic input structures and processes. But the notion of
the allegiant citizen would soon be defied by elite-
challenging political actions such as the student protests
of the 1960s. This gave rise to new questions: Were these
actions undermining representative democracy? Or did
they represent a different form of political participation that
at the same time showed a strong attachment to democratic
norms and disillusionment with some aspects of the dem-
ocratic process? Inglehart (1977) provided a new frame-
work for the so-called assertive citizen that would
address some of these concerns. He linked the spread of
elite-challenging actions to the rise of post-materialist val-
ues that emphasize self-expression and direct participation
in politics.
Elite-challenging attitudes and post-materialist values
brought new tensions to representative democracy. They
contributed to political and partisan competition over new
cleavages beyond the long-standing economic cleavage
centered on economic distribution (e.g. Kitschelt, 1995).
New parties on the left and right of the political spectrum
emerged, mobilized over the environment, new politics,
immigration and traditional values. At the same time,
decreasing levels of turnout and trust in institutions—trig-
gered by political crises (Van Erkel et al., 2016) and the
corrupt behavior of politicians (Rose and Weßels, 2019)—
were observed in contexts where support for democracy
and democratic norms remained stable (Dalton, 2004;
Norris, 2011).
These developments were linked to massive changes in
electoral competition and party systems in many democra-
cies—especially in connection with electoral losses of tra-
ditionally large and regularly governing parties. It is widely
recognized that growing political cynicism and decreasing
levels of political trust in established democracies facilitate
the growth of protest politics as well as extreme anti-state
parties (Cheles et al., 1995; Craig and Maggiotto, 1981;
Muller et al., 1982) and depress support for established
parties (Mair et al., 2004).
In this paper, we understand trust in democratic pro-
cesses as a form of generalized support which constitutes
a powerful resource for political legitimacy. Being an
advance on the future based on evaluation of past perfor-
mance, it serves as a buffer against citizens’ performance-
based dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy.
We distinguish two central recipients of political trust in
representative democracies: national parliaments, as an
institutional recipient, and political parties, as actor-
centered recipients. Parliaments are the bodies which, by
virtue of their legislative capacity, have the final say about
policies, and as such they are judged by citizens according
to their procedural performance. By contrast, as European
democracies are party democracies, citizens give parties
the mandate to act on their behalf, and therefore they are
judged according to their action performance. From this
viewpoint, legitimacy is at risk when citizens do not trust
political parties.
Most scholarly work approaches the relationship
between political trust and party system developments from
the perspective of new or challenger parties. To put it sim-
ply, these parties are electorally successful due to low lev-
els of trust. Challenger parties can either motivate voters
from established parties to switch or mobilize non-voters.
We argue that for the mechanism of vote switching to work,
established parties must first lose the trust of voters; either
voters lose trust in the central arena for parties, the national
parliament, or lose trust in parties themselves as key dem-
ocratic actors. Therefore, in this study, we examine the
relationship between institutional and actor-centered polit-
ical trust and the electoral fortune of insider parties, i.e. the
parties that are or have recently been in government. As
insider parties are losing votes in various democracies, this
study also contributes to further understanding the factors
that drive party system change and developments. We do so
in their chronological and logical order. While our analysis
might not lead to very different conclusions than those
taking up the outsider-party perspective, our study is the
first to validate the underlying but never tested assumptions
of those studies. We address two crucial questions: Can the
decline of insider parties be linked to decreasing levels of
political trust? And, is this association mainly driven by an
institution-centered dimension or an actor-centered dimen-
sion of political trust?
This study relies on cross-national time-series to mea-
sure in the aggregate the relationship between political
trust and support for insider parties. It covers 30 countries
and 137 elections from 1998 to 2018, thereby including
countries with a wide array of democratic, institutional,
and economic features. We indeed find that higher levels
of political trust lead to more electoral support for insider
parties. However, our results indicate that this effect is
stronger and more reliable for trust in the national parlia-
ment than for trust in political parties—the institutional
perspective is more important in the eyes of the citizens.
This leads us to conclude that citizens’ judgment on insti-
tutions and representatives plays a major role in their
decision to support incumbent parties or to search for
different electoral options.
Political trust and insider party support
Changes in electoral markets have been observed across
European democracies. While electoral support for tradi-
tionally governing parties on the center-right and center-
left has declined, other parties—in particular niche, radical
and populist parties—have gained votes (Abou-Chadi,
2016; Meguid, 2005; Van Spanje, 2010; Wagner, 2012).
Such changes have been explained by the decline of party
loyalties (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) and social group
cohesion (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), linked to
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changes in value orientation that accounted for traditional
divides in Western Europe (Inglehart, 1971), and to the
declining impact of classical cleavages (Lipset and Rok-
kan, 1967). In almost all established democracies, so-called
insider parties—parties that have recently been in govern-
ment either on their own or in coalitions (e.g. Barr, 2009;
Hobolt and Tilley, 2016)—come under pressure due to the
presence of new contenders and, in consequence, party
systems are changing dramatically in terms of fragmenta-
tion as well as polarization.
In contrast to expectations first formulated in Kirchhei-
mer’s catch-all party concept (1966), or the idea of a “run-
to-the-middle” to be as close as possible to the median
voter, as deduced from Downs’s work (1957), in recent
years we do not see traditionally large parties thriving, but
failing. Especially the success of populist parties points to
the relevance of non-policy related issues to account for
these developments. Clearly, some voters are possibly
attracted to new parties because of their policy offer, which
might be better adapted to the challenges of the 21st cen-
tury than the offer of social-democratic, liberal or conser-
vative parties. For many other voters, dissatisfaction with
and low levels of trust in the democratic process and dem-
ocratic institutions and actors may influence their electoral
choices.
Interestingly, we know little about whether there is a
linkage between the public evaluation of the performance
of parliaments and parties on the one hand and the support
for insider parties on the other. A stream of research has
examined the relationship between the success of radical
parties and declining institutional trust (Belanger and
Aarts, 2006; Lubbers et al., 2002) and also the growth of
protest politics and extreme anti-state parties (Cheles et al.,
1995; Craig and Maggiotto, 1981; Fieschi and Heywood,
2004; Hooghe et al. 2011; Muller, 1979; Muller et al.,
1982). A second stream has focused on the effects of polit-
ical corruption on citizen’s evaluations of the political sys-
tem and trust in civil servants (Anderson and Tverdova,
2003) and the relationship between failed government per-
formance and declining support for government institutions
and politicians (Miller and Listhaug, 1999). Yet it is crucial
to establish the linkage between political trust and the for-
tune of insider parties in order to understand the possible
consequence of declining confidence and what can be done
to mitigate it.
As we outline below, most of the literature approaches
this relationship the other way around: dissatisfied citizens
with low levels of political trust vote for outsider parties.
Hence, we can explain the success of populist parties in part
with traditional or more specific measures of trust in the
political elite (Arzheimer, 2009; Oesch, 2008; Rooduijn
et al., 2016). We argue that many of these studies take the
second step before the first. Chronologically and logically,
the loss of trust must first lead to a turning away from
insider parties and then to a turning to outsider parties.
Therefore, this study investigates how levels of political
trust determine the electoral fortunes of insider parties.
Political trust in institutions measures citizens’ confi-
dence toward governments, parliaments, the executive, the
legal system and the police, the state bureaucracy, political
parties and the military (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995; Lipset
and Schneider, 1987), with a certain degree of variance
resulting from the battery of questions included in various
representative national and cross-national surveys. Not-
withstanding the differences in approaches to measuring
confidence, there is a common understanding that political
trust is a multi-dimensional construct (see for instance
Breustedt, 2018) and that the public is able to distinguish
between the different dimensions, for example between the
institutions and the actors within a representative democ-
racy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995: 23).
This contribution examines two dimensions of political
trust—one institutional and one actor-centered—that are
closely linked to political legitimacy: parliaments and
political parties. We focus on generalized support for the
institution—i.e. the approval of the parliament’s powers—
and on the confidence in key actors, measured as trust in
political parties. In all democracies, parliaments are the
bodies which, as legislators, have the final say about poli-
cies. As an institution, a parliament is non-partisan a priori.
What counts is the representative function of a parliament.
Thus, it is not substantial, but procedural performance that
matters most for gaining trust. Moreover, democracy in
European polities is party democracy. This implies that
voting means voting for parties. Thus, citizens as principals
give parties the mandate to act on their behalf. The parties
in turn become the principals of their representatives in
parliament and government. They commit their MPs to
their program, and through this commitment, “parties are
essential for making the democratic accountability of MPs
meaningful” (Müller, 2000: 311). Political parties are thus
the bearers of the voters’ mandate. It therefore depends on
the substantial performance of the parties whether they gain
trust or not.
This differentiation between trust in an institution and
trust in actors is consistent with the distinction Easton intro-
duced in his seminal book (1965). He distinguished three
dimensions of political support: support for the community,
the regime and the authorities—with institutions being part
of the regime dimension and authorities including political
actors. More than three decades later, Norris and colleagues
(1999) provided a greater refinement of Easton’s categories
and distinguished five dimensions: support for the commu-
nity, regime principles, regime performance, regime insti-
tutions and political actors. These dimensions range in a
continuum from the “most diffuse support for the nation-
state down through successive levels to the most concrete
support for particular politicians” (Norris, 2011: 6). Parlia-
ments are regime institutions, parties are political actors
that are judged by the people according to different criteria.
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While parliaments are judged by their procedural per-
formance, parties should be and are judged by their action
performance. In general, political objects can be evaluated
with regard to either their performance (what they do) or
their quality (how they do it). Both criteria are evaluative,
one more instrumental, the other more moral (Fuchs, 1989).
Using Easton’s language, trust in parliament measures sup-
port for the regime institutions, trust in parties measures
support for authorities (Easton, 1965). These two aspects,
procedure and performance, are crucial to citizen’s support
for democracy and the perceived legitimacy of the regime.
The procedural aspect is relevant for making majority deci-
sions binding for all, even when they belong to a minority.
The performance aspect is crucial in determining whether
those who have the mandate fulfill it satisfactorily or
poorly. Legitimacy is at risk when people think that insti-
tutions are subordinated to poorly functioning political
elites making fair representation impossible, and that par-
ties do not care about their promises or the people. If this is
the case, voters will turn their backs on the established
parties and look for other options.
In order to examine the electoral consequences of
changes in political trust, we distinguish between insider
and outsider parties. We define parties based on their expe-
rience with and their position in the party system according
to the categorization introduced by Barr (2009: 33). Insider
parties are those parties that have participated in govern-
ment and influenced policy outcomes for which they can be
held accountable. In the eyes of the voters, there is “clarity
of responsibility” as these parties are responsible for gov-
ernment performance (De Vries et al., 2011). Outsider par-
ties, by contrast, are those parties that do not receive
enough votes to participate in government, or even if their
vote-share would allow it, have gone through a period of
not being considered as being “capable of forming a
coalition” because of their own political position or of the
position of other parties in the system that impose a cordon
sanitaire (McDonnell and Newell, 2011).
The rationale behind the insider/outsider categorization
is straightforward. Parties that participate in government
are responsible for policy outcomes and are therefore sub-
ject to public scrutiny. Since voters are exposed to a big
amount of information about the actions of these parties, it
is relatively easy for them to form an opinion and evaluate
their performance (Kumlin, 2004). And, performance dis-
satisfaction may translate into electoral losses.
We contend that our proposed distinction of parties,
where parties are defined based on the basis of their rela-
tionship with the government, is more appropriate to under-
stand the electoral effects of citizens’ levels of political
trust than other approaches. For instance, one existing mea-
sure classifies parties based on their ideological party fam-
ilies. A second alternative categorizes parties into
mainstream and niche, based on their function in the party
system and whether they embrace traditional class-based
orientation politics or prioritize issues that were previously
outside the dimensions of party competition and limit their
issue appeals so that they constitute as single-issue parties
(Meguid, 2005). While both approaches have their merits,
they do not serve the purpose of our study as they do not
allow us to investigate the way government responsibilities
may affect citizens’ trust in the national parliament and par-
ties. In other words, when examining the electoral fortune of
insider parties, we do not take an ideological approach or
focus on issue entrepreneurship or policy offer, but take into
account how performance-induced changes in political trust
relate to election results.
In view of the theoretical and empirical considerations
outlined above, we formulate two rather straight-forward
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The more voters trust the parliament, the
higher the support for insider parties.
Hypothesis 2: The more voters trust political parties,
the higher the support for insider parties.
Our findings provide important insights into how polit-
ical trust relates to party system changes and power shifts
from one group of parties to another. Moreover, by focus-
ing on political trust as the core predictor, we link the
literature on the crisis of democracy and the rise of new
parties—especially populist parties—to the fate of estab-
lished insider parties while simultaneously distinguishing
different types of political trust. Finally, we do so by look-
ing at the developments in a logical order: lower levels of
political trust lead to less support for insider parties, which
then leads to the rise of new challengers. In the next section
we will present the operationalization of the main vari-




Testing the relationship between trust and the electoral
fortune of insider parties in a comparative set-up and over
time requires a series of research design decisions. We
examine the relationship between trust and support for insi-
der parties at the country-election level. We chose this level
of aggregation because we are interested in the aggregate
level effects of trust on electoral outcomes. While this
poses the risk of ecological fallacy, which may limit causal
claims, macro-level analysis allows us to cover a much
larger number of countries and time points and thus inves-
tigate developments over time in a broader comparative
context.
Data on trust represents aggregate figures from the
Eurobarometer survey program, which constitutes the most
comprehensive data source on political trust. We cover
elections between 1998 and 2018 for 30 countries,
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matching between measures of trust from survey data
(starting in 1997) and election results.1 Figure 1 illustrates
the structure of our data and the link between political trust
and support for insider parties by country using France as
an example. The independent variables (left panel) are trust
in parliament and parties measured using public opinion
data extracted from the Eurobarometer survey closest to a
particular upcoming election. The dependent variable
(right panel) is the vote share of insider parties in a given
election. We measure the relationship between the two
independent variables and the outcome variables for all
general elections for which we have Eurobarometer data
on public opinion.
Operationalization
Like extant studies, we classify parties as insider parties
based on their participation in government. In a study
examining the rise of challenger parties after the euro crisis
across European democracies, Hobolt and Tilley (2016) use
a maximal definition of insider parties considering those
that participated in any national-level government in the 30
years before the euro crisis (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016: 975).
By contrast, in a study on issue attention, Klüver and Spoon
(2016) use a minimal definition of insiderness by consid-
ering only the last government.
Interested in a measure that captures participation in
government for a longer period, but also allows for changes
in the composition of insider parties, our dependent vari-
able measures the vote share of parties that participated in
government in the last 20 years prior to an election. In the
case of younger democracies included in our sample, we
took the longest possible period going back to the first
democratic election. This classification of insider parties
yielded an average of seven parties per country and elec-
tion.2 Elections results are taken from the GovElec data-
base (WZB, 2019), which also provides information on
government participation.
To measure our main independent variables, we use
Eurobarometer data asking survey respondents to indicate
whether or not they trust the national parliament and polit-
ical parties in their countries.3 Our indicators trust in par-
liaments and trust in political parties measure the
percentage of survey respondents that said they “tend to
trust” in the Eurobarometer survey preceding a given elec-
tion, excluding respondents with missing values. For the
calculation of the proportions, all relevant post-
stratification weights have been applied. The values range
from 0 (no trust) to 1 (full trust).
In our statistical model, we include several controls for
potential confounders. The first two variables aim at con-
trolling for mechanical factors that may affect our outcome
variable. The total vote share of insider parties is likely to
be affected by the number of different parties that partici-
pated in recent governments: if the number of parties
increases, the share of votes for insider parties is also likely
to increase. We thus control for number of insider parties,
which refers to the total number of parties that have been in
government in the 20 years before the election. Further-
more, it is possible that available alternative parties may
affect the decision of voters to no longer support insider
parties. We therefore include the variable total number of
outsider parties, which indicates the total number of parties
in the specific election that did not participate in recent
governments. The information for both variables is taken
from the GovElec database (WZB, 2019).
Trust in parliament/parties 
(pre-election survey closest to election t)
France (EB 57.1: 2002)
Fieldwork: 02.04.2002 - 29.04.2002
Trust in parliament/parties 
(pre-election survey closest to election t+1)
France (EB 66.3: 2006)
Fieldwork: 17.11.2006 - 15.12.2006
Trust in parliament/parties 
(pre-election survey closest to election t + 3)












2017 French General Election
Election date: 11.06.2017
… …
Figure 1. Data structure and linkage.
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Dissatisfaction is also associated with lower levels of
turnout (Grönlund and Setälä, 2007) and turnout can also
influence elections results (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007).
The variable turnout measures the percentage of the elec-
torate that voted in a given election (WZB, 2019). More-
over, the relationship of trust in institutions as well as core
democratic actors and the vote shares of governing parties
may also be affected by structural conditions such as the
state of a democracy and the state of the economy. The
variable liberal democracy measures the level of liberal
democracy in a country using the V-Dem’s liberal democ-
racy index (Coppedge et al., 2019; Pemstein et al., 2019).
Moreover, age of democracy measures the number of years
between democratization and a given election, also taken
from the V-Dem dataset. Additionally, to account for the
country’s economic conditions, we use GDP per capita,
which measures the gross domestic production measured
as per capita basis taken from the World Bank database
(World Bank, 2019).
For our analyses, we lagged the variables liberal democ-
racy and GDP per capita by 1 year. We also standardized all
continuous independent variables following Gelman’s
(2008) approach, which allows for direct comparison of all
coefficients in a regression model. This is done by dividing
the values by two standard deviations. Table A1 in the
Online Appendix summarizes the operationalization of the
dependent variable, core predictors and control variables.
Cases and estimation method
Cross-sectional time-series data have “observations on the
same units in several different time periods” (Kennedy,
2008: 281) allowing us to explore more dimensions than
cross-sectional or time-series data alone. As Baltagi (2013:
6) puts it, “panel data give more informative data, more
variability, less collinearity among the variables, more
degrees of freedom and more efficiency.” Our data
constitutes a fixed panel where the same countries are
observed over time. We compare data across 30 European
countries and 137 elections. We have only included coun-
tries for which we had at least three observations with
information for all variables. Table 1 summarizes the coun-
tries and elections included in the analysis.4 The data form
a short panel, where the number of countries outnumbers
the number of observations per country (Cameron and Tri-
vedi, 2010: 230). Moreover, since general elections take
place in different years and are spaced differently from
country to country, we are dealing with an unbalanced
panel where some cells in the contingency table have zero
frequency. As such, unbalanced panel data entail computa-
tion and estimation challenges, which we address.
The panel data models we implement seek to examine
and control for country and time effects in order to tackle
heterogeneity and country-level effects that may not be
observed. We run a specification test to compare the ran-
dom effect model to the fixed effect model (Hausman,
1978). The result of such a test shows that fixed effects
were more suitable for our data, a finding that was also
confirmed by tests for over-identifying restrictions (Schaf-
fer and Stillman, 2006). Additional tests (Greene 2000)
indicate that the models suffer from groupwise heterosce-
dasticity in the residuals. Hence, we apply fixed effects
time-series regression models with robust standard errors,
where we consider each election result as a single case in a
time series.5
Results
We start our empirical analysis with a comparison of trends
in the electoral support for insider parties and trust in
national parliaments as well as parties by country over
time. From left to right, Figure 2 shows the proportion of
votes received by governing parties and the proportion of
the public that expressed trust in national parliaments and
Table 1. Elections by country.
Country Elections Country Elections
Austria 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017 Latvia 2006, 2010, 2011, 2014
Belgium 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014 Lithuania 2008, 2012, 2016
Bulgaria 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017 Luxembourg 1999, 2004, 2009, 2013, 2018
Croatia 2007, 2011, 2015, 2016 Malta 2008, 2013, 2017
Cyprus 2006, 2011, 2016 Netherlands 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
Czech Republic 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017 North Macedonia 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016
Denmark 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015 Poland 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
Estonia 2007, 2011, 2015 Portugal 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015
Finland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 Romania 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
France 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017 Slovakia 2006, 2010, 2012, 2016
Germany 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017 Slovenia 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018
Greece 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2015 Spain 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016
Hungary 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Ireland 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016 Turkey 2007, 2011, 2015, 2018
Italy 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018 United Kingdom 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































trust in parties for the countries with the highest (Malta and
Finland), medium (Denmark and Belgium) and lowest
(Italy and Latvia) levels of vote shares for insider parties.6
This selection of countries is very similar to the develop-
ments we find for all countries in our sample and therefore
we have limited the cases for reasons of visualization.
However, the supplemental material includes figures for
all countries (Figures A1 to A3).
First of all, we see that there is a lot of variation of all
three indicators over time—with the exception of insider
vote shares in Malta and trust in parties in Latvia. More-
over, there is also tremendous variation between countries.
For example, insider vote share levels drop below 25 per-
cent in some countries while they are close to 100 percent
in others. Overall, we observe that support for insider par-
ties tends to be higher when political trust is higher.
Comparing the two trust measures, we can conclude that
trust in parties tends to be considerably lower than trust in
parliaments. It also becomes obvious that there is not a
common (declining) pattern in Europe—for any of the
three indicators. If at all, we see decreasing levels of trust
at the end of the 2000s, followed by a period in which
confidence in parliaments and parties seems to be stronger
again.
While there are no clear-cut general trends, this does not
automatically mean that there is also no covariation. In
other words, the development of insider vote shares could
still depend on trust in parties or parliaments. Figure 3
presents these relationships in a very simple way: the y-
axis represents the vote share of all insider parties in a party
system at a given election. The x-axis refers to trust in
political parties (gray symbols) and in national parliaments
(black symbols) before the election. We have included two
lines representing the relationship regarding the 137 elec-
tions included in our analysis. As expected, we see a pos-
itive correlation between insider parties’ electoral fortune
and the two trust measures taken from surveys before the
respective election. If citizens have confidence in political
parties and the national parliaments, insider parties perform
better in the following national election.
While this can be interpreted as a first bit of evidence
validating our hypotheses, it clearly requires much more
rigorous testing, accounting for the peculiar data structure
as well as potential confounders. Table 2 shows the results of
three time-series cross-section regressions with fixed effects,
robust standard errors and a set of controls as outlined above.
The outcome variable in the three models is the vote share of
insider parties. Models 1 and 2 investigate the effect of trust
in parliament and trust in parties separately, while the third
model includes both predictors of interest.
Looking first at the control variables, we find some
stable patterns across all three models. We observe a stable
effect of our mechanical control variables: the more parties
are considered insider parties, the higher their overall vote
share. Unsurprisingly, the effect is negative for the number
of outsider parties. Turnout levels and GDP per capita do
not relate systematically to insider parties’ vote shares.
However, we find that older democracies have less success-
ful insider parties and thus more fluid, fragmented, and
volatile party systems. This corresponds to the observable
developments in many established democracies, e.g.
France, Germany, or Italy. Finally, in Model 2, there is also
a positive effect of the degree of liberal democracy—but
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Trust
Trust in Political Parties Fitted Values Trust in National Parliaments Fitted Values
Source: Eurobarometer and GovElec 1997-2018
Figure 3. Trust in national parliaments and political parties and support for governing parties in Europe, 1997 to 2018.
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But does trust in parliament and in political parties have
an effect on the success of insider parties? The first two
models support our hypothesis that trust has a positive
effect on the electoral success of insider parties. Both
effects are statistically significant and quite substantial.
Since we use standardized predictors, we can directly com-
pare the effect sizes: insider vote share increases by close to
18 per cent when trust in parliament increases by one unit
(read: two standard deviations). Slightly weaker, Model 2
still predicts roughly 11 per cent higher vote shares if trust
in parties increases by one unit. Taking into account that we
are left with only a small number of cases and a rather
complex modeling approach, finding significant and sub-
stantive effects is a strong indicator in favor of our theore-
tical argument. Interestingly, it seems trust in the national
parliament—the institutional perspective—is more rele-
vant than trust in parties, the actor-centered perspective.
Finally, when adding both measures to the regression
model (Model 3), trust in political parties does not only
change its sign, but also becomes statistically undistin-
guishable from zero. At the same time, the effect of trust
in parliament stays significant and substantive. The higher
relevance is also underlined when looking at the within-R2
values. When comparing Model 1 and Model 3, the addi-
tion of trust in parties does not really help to explain the
variation in the dependent variable, and the within-R2 value
is also somewhat lower for Model 2.
In summary, our empirical analyses suggest that there is
a strong correlation between political trust, measured as
trust in national parliaments and trust in parties, and the
support for insider parties. However, trust in parliament—
institutional confidence—seems to be more important than
trust in parties to explain the fortunes of insider parties. In
other words, Hypothesis 1 is clearly validated, while our
second hypothesis, which argues for the role of the actor-
centered perspective on trust, only holds true if we do not
control for the effect of institutional trust.
Our study design and estimation approach are very
demanding and make our findings to a certain degree vul-
nerable to specific research design decisions. Therefore, we
have estimated various additional models to further vali-
date our results. The detailed results can be found in the
supplemental material, but we will also briefly present
the results of our additional analyses here. First, although
the theoretical argument as well as several tests indicated
that fixed-effects estimation is superior, we also estimated
the models with a random-effects specification (Table A4).
This does not change our findings regarding the two trust
measures—both have a significant and positive effect when
included separately. The effect of trust in the national par-
liaments is not only stronger, but also keeps its statistical
significance in the combined model. Second, while our
main models explore the link between trust and the vote
share of insider parties that governed in the two decades
prior to the election, the results are possibly dependent on
the time period chosen. We therefore re-estimate these
models using a different specification of the dependent
variable that measures the vote shares of those parties that
Table 2. The estimated relationship between trust in national parliament and the vote share of insider parties.
(1) (2) (3)
Parliament model Party model Combined model


















































R2 (within) 0.36 0.30 0.36
N 137 137 137
Notes: Time-series cross-section regression analyses with fixed effects and robust standard errors; standard errors in brackets;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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have been in government in the last 10 and 30 years.7 The
findings from this exercise (Table A5) indicate that there
are no relevant differences to our main models presented
above when looking at the effects of the two trust measures.
Third, time-series models can be biased due to autocorrela-
tion. We validate that such a bias does not pose a problem
for our results by also running models including the lagged
dependent variable (Table A6). Not only is there no signif-
icant effect of the lagged vote share of insider parties, but
we also find no changes regarding our core predictors. The
results even hold with a significantly lower number of cases
(from 137 down to 107). Finally, we also estimate addi-
tional models, including election year dummies to control
for time trends. This also does not lead to any problematic
differences to our main models (Table A7). Based on the
results of the additional tests, we can conclude that our
findings are valid and reliable.
Conclusion and implications
This study assessed the relationship between political trust
and support for insider parties. The motivation of this assess-
ment stems from the fact that disaffection with politics ben-
efits the electoral fortune of challenger parties. Since voting
is a zero-sum game, it is somewhat surprising that empirical
studies linking distrust or dissatisfaction with recent elec-
toral developments mostly focused on explaining the success
of parties challenging the established set of parties. In con-
trast, we argued that the window of opportunity for these
new or outsider parties is logically due to established insider
parties losing the trust of voters in the democratic process.
Hence, empirical analysis has to focus on the effect of trust
levels on the electoral fortunes of insider parties to validate
the distrust mechanism assumed to be at the heart of current
party system developments. Based on the comparative anal-
ysis of 30 countries and 137 elections between 1998 and
2018 in Europe, we find that trust in parliament is related
to a higher degree of insider party support (Hypothesis 1).
We also find a positive and significant relationship between
trust in parties and insider party support (Hypothesis 2), yet
the extent of this relationship is lower compared to trust in
parliaments and it is also not robust if we add both trust
indicators to the model.
What are the implications of our findings? The results
suggest that trust levels are indeed of high importance for
voters to vote for a party that has or has not participated in
recent governments. If political trust before an election is
low, insider parties lose support. This demobilizing effect
of insider parties seems to create space for new challengers.
At the same time, the story that dissatisfaction only leads to
support for new outsider parties is too short-sighted. Insider
parties obviously contribute to their voters turning away
from them because they do not fulfill their demands,
thereby undermining positive evaluations of the democratic
process as well as its core actors and institutions. The
alternatives for those disaffected are two-fold. They can
abstain or vote for outsider parties. New political entrepre-
neurs or existing outsider parties play a crucial role in
mobilizing the dissatisfied and widening gap in the elec-
toral market. This seems to be especially the case with
populist or similar parties, which attract voters not only
in terms of substantive policy offers, but also to a large
degree for anti-establishment portfolios. In other words, the
changes in party systems that we are witnessing in many
democracies around the world are only partly the result of
an apparent orientation of established parties to the median
voter or the slow adaptation to new issues. While such
developments and failings—if perceived as such by citi-
zens—could lead to lower levels of political trust, it seems
highly plausible that trust as a generalized attribute also
stems from other factors and sources. This is also supported
to a certain degree by the fact that trust in the national
parliament seems to be a more decisive factor than trust
in parties. Such an institutional perspective is much more
linked to a functional perspective of democracy than to
mere issues of preference representation by specific parties.
The positive side of this finding is that trust in the institu-
tions of democracy remains quite high, while trust in polit-
ical actors such as political parties is more dependent on
performance. At a very general level, this difference
reflects the difference between mechanisms of regime
legitimacy and mechanisms of accountability.
This paper in no way contradicts earlier findings about
favorable conditions for new or challenger—read: outsi-
der—parties. However, we provide sound empirical evi-
dence that decreasing levels of political trust are the
downfall of insider parties, to a certain degree independent
of whether there are outside electoral alternatives. While
we find that the existence of outsider parties decreases the
vote share of insider parties, this does not imply that the
effect of political trust disappears. In terms of understand-
ing the chronological and logical steps of party system
development in Europe, we provide an important new piece
to complete the puzzle. This might also help to think about
counter-strategies. As difficult as it may be, against the
threat of populist and radical parties, insider parties must
maintain or regain the trust of citizens—not only in them-
selves, but above all in the national parliament as the home
of representative democracy.
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Notes
1. A micro-level analysis would not be possible with the data at
hand, as crucial other variables—primarily vote choice or vote
intention—are not or no longer part of the Eurobarometer
questionnaire. Hence, we prioritize the number of countries,
elections and years that can be covered with our approach over
the advantages of micro-level analyses.
2. We have used different time periods (10 and 30 years) for
robustness checks and our findings do not depend on a specific
duration.
3. “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you
have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following
media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend
not to trust it: 1) the national parliament, 2) political parties.”
4. Additional information can be found in Tables A2 and in
Online Appendix C as well as in the Eurobarometer study
descriptions. We had three cases in which two general elec-
tions took place in the same year (Greece 2012, Greece 2015,
and Turkey 2015). In the first two cases we examine the second
election, in the third case the first election. These decisions
were based on whether or not a Eurobarometer survey was
conducted before the election.
5. We also ran a set of robustness checks using different opera-
tionalizations and estimation strategies. These results are sum-
marized at the end of the “Results” section and in the Online
Appendix. Fortunately, our findings are very robust and not
affected substantively by such decisions.
6. There is more data available from the Eurobarometer surveys
than we can use in our statistical analysis, as we are only
interested in the last survey before an election. However, for
the descriptive figure, we use all data to have the best possible
information on time trends.
7. For obvious reasons, this also means that this changes the
period in which the number of insider and outsider parties is
determined.
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